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I: INTRODUCTION 
 
The advent of the national media age has had a profound effect on the proliferation of 
information. The development of the 24-hour news cycle, created as a function of the relatively 
recent establishment of cable news and the internet as a primary means of news media 
consumption, has sharply increased the volume of media stories and information available. This 
has had a profound effect on business and investment, colloquially noted by the growing national 
significance of media entities such as CNBC, The Wall Street Journal, and other similar outlets.1 
The creation of this new media in the early 1980’s, interestingly, coincided with a large spike in 
the number of publicly traded companies that released special items, and accompanying pro 
forma earnings estimates to compensate for them. See Exhibit 1 for a graph depicting this trend. 
As has been demonstrated by previous research, media attention has a significant effect 
on corporate behavior, providing an extra level of regulation as the “watchdog” of policy. 
However, what has not been determined is the level to which the volume of media scrutiny 
affects earnings expectation management practice. Given the almost identical chronology which 
the trend of media growth and pro forma earnings share, it seems relevant that any possible 
relationship should be investigated.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 (Meschke 2004) 
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This study seeks to find if there is a significant relationship between the amount of media 
coverage focused on public companies in the United States and the difference between GAAP 
financial performance and analyst-adjusted estimates of financial performance. I will answer this 
question by testing this difference among S&P 500 companies, as well as companies within that 
index as identified by a certain industry.  
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II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Through my research, I was not able to find any study linking the difference between pro 
forma earnings releases and GAAP earnings to media attention. However, there have been many 
studies that suggest that media attention has a statistically significant effect on corporate policy 
and behavior. 
First, it was necessary to establish that the media itself played a significant role in the 
business world, rather than simply acting as a conduit of relayed information. In “What 
Determines Corporate Transparency,” a study finds that financial transparency is primarily 
related to political economies with low state ownership of enterprise, banks, and low risk of 
expropriation of private assets.2 Corporate transparency is defined as “the joint output of 
multifaceted systems whose components collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate 
information to market participants outside of the firm.”3 They use three informative mechanisms 
to determine its relevance: the corporate reporting regime,4 the intensity of private information 
acquisition,5 and information dissemination.6 Of primary interest here, though, is their use of 
media penetration in addition to these factors.7,8 In the study of information dissemination, media 
is found to be positively correlated with disclosure intensity9 and the prevalence of proprietary 
disclosures10 among the same sample.  
                                                          
2
 (Robert M. Bushman 2004) 
3
 (Robert M. Bushman 2004) 
4
“measures of intensity, principles, timeliness, and audit quality of financial disclosures.” 208 
5
 Measures of analyst following and the prevalence of pooled investment schemes and insider trading activity, 208 
6
 The extent of media penetration in an economy. 
7
 Defined as the average rank of countries’ per capita number of newspapers and televisions from 1993-1995 
8
 Although these transparency measures are used to examine business conditions on a country-by-country basis, the 
paper argues that the same measures conceptually apply at the firm level. 
9
 Defined as the number of accounting and non-accounting items disclosed in a sample of large firm annual reports 
10
 Defined as research and development expenses, capital expenditures, product and geographic segment data, 
subsidiary information, and accounting methods. 
4 
 
With the importance of media attention as it relates to corporate transparency established, 
the study finds that investor demand for financial transparency increases with the protection of 
rights, and as such countries with a legal system rooted in English common law (such as the 
United States) have the strongest cultures of corporate transparency. These countries are also 
more likely to have a higher relative importance of market financing to bank financing, further 
contributing to the widespread demand for information. 
But how do the media act in a way that determines corporate transparency? “The 
Corporate Governance Role of the Media” argues that the media compels corporate managers to 
act in a way that is considered to be “socially acceptable.”11 The primary role of the media, for 
both consumer and investor, is to “reduce the costs of collecting and evaluating information,” 
and as a consequence, it plays “a major role in the shaping the creation and accumulation of 
reputation.”12 It achieves this through three primary means. First, media attention can influence 
lawmakers to create corporate law reform, as their inaction on an issue which the media portrays 
as a problem creates public embarrassment for the politician in question and reduces his chance 
for reelection.13 The second way is drawn through the traditional understanding of how managers 
are compensated: as managers are entrusted by shareholders to oversee activities of the business 
that cannot be monitored by investors, a monetary or even criminal penalty assessed as a 
consequence of executive impropriety discovered by the media dissuades managers from taking 
advantage of self-dealing opportunities.14 Finally, the paper argues that an equally discouraging 
eventuality of socially unacceptable corporate policy is the embarrassment that managers feel 
                                                          
11
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
12
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
13
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
14
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
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when challenged by their friends and family members on the issue, who have learned of the 
policy through the media.15 
Using corporate environmental policy as a proxy for firm behavior, the study finds that 
countries with a wider newspaper circulation have better environmental responsiveness, 
controlling for regulatory factors. The study finds a strong correlation between the diffusion of 
the press and corporate response to environmental issues; the media pressure that arises as a 
function of its proliferation incentivizes managers not just to act in the interests of shareholders, 
but in a way that is deemed to be publicly acceptable16 vis-à-vis the media itself.17 Indeed, the 
norms communicated by the media can even controvert shareholders’ interests, and impel 
managers to actively work against maximizing value.18 This effect is variable depending on the 
diffusion of corporate shares: firms with consolidated ownership are less likely to be affected by 
media attention than those with broad ownership.19 
A critical distinction made by the study, as explored further in “The Press as a Watchdog 
for Accounting Fraud,” is that the relative usefulness of media information as it relates to 
corporate policy is intrinsically related to the medium of consumption.20 Trade newspapers and 
other financial publications are much more likely to uncover significant corporate malfeasance 
than their counterparts in mainstream media; such information is the primary demand of their 
consumers.21 Relayed and repeated information, according to the study, is of little use. Therefore, 
this study will only use print journalism indicators, as they are much more likely to carry new 
                                                          
15
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
16
 This was found to be true even in the absence of legal requirement or liability. 
17
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
18
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
19
 (Alexander Dyck 2002) 
20
 (Miller 2006) 
21
 (Miller 2006) 
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information rather than to relay that which has already been reported (the effective role of 
television journalism).  Regardless of the medium, the tone of the media has been shown to 
actually report (or project) investor sentiment before it is fully incorporated into an equity price, 
accelerating the process of inclusion.22 
The specific nature of the tone and spin of earnings releases has also been found to be 
significant. In “The Impact of Spin and Tone of Stock Returns and Volatility,” a study finds that 
positive tone of an earnings release has a positive impact on stock returns and decreases 
volatility, while negative tone decreases returns and increases volatility.23 The tone of spin 
emanating from the firm should be of prime importance to this study. A positive or negative 
earnings surprise could have a substantial effect on the difference between pro forma earnings 
and GAAP earnings and the volume of media scrutiny directed towards the firm.  
Pro forma earnings formed by analysts are created in large part by amending GAAP 
financial data to conform to disclosures made by the company as to the business realities it 
foresees stemming from any possible event. As such, it is important to note whether these 
disclosures materially contribute to analyst predictions. In “Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of 
Accounting Standards, and Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy: An International Study,” the study 
finds that the quantity of firm-level annual report disclosures is positively correlated to analyst 
forecast accuracy, giving credence to the notion that such information is of material importance 
to analysts.24The level of analyst following for a particular firm, however, is negatively 
correlated to analyst forecast accuracy.25 Large corporations with a high level of analyst 
following typically have a wider array of information available than what is printed in annual 
                                                          
22
 (Paul C. Tetlock 2008) 
23
 (Shibley Sadique 2008) 
24
 (Hope 2003) 
25
 (Hope 2003) 
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report disclosures, and therefore analyst projections of those companies may be more prone to 
noise generated by the media. Whether this skews the data in my study will be explored further.  
The importance of the difference between “Street” (pro forma) and GAAP earnings, 
however, has not always been clear. In “The Debate over GAAP versus Street Earnings 
Revisited” attempts to reconcile whether firms are “using Street earnings to manipulate investor 
beliefs in a manner that leads to inflated stock prices” or that “Street earnings are generally more 
informative than GAAP earnings, and thus rational investors prefer to rely on [street earnings] to 
make their investment decisions.”26  
The study finds this argument flawed in two ways. First, observations of a positive 
difference between street earnings and GAAP earnings disproportionally support the argument 
for investor reliance on such measures.27 Second, the observations of a negative difference 
between Street earnings and GAAP earnings similarly inflate statistical support for the earnings 
inflation argument. In fact, the effect of such a difference is actually the opposite of what is 
argued by both sides: “when Street earnings are less than GAAP earnings, the measured market 
response for the Street earnings surprise is greater than the GAAP earnings-based surprise,” and 
vice versa.28 Overall, the study does not find one measure to be substantively more useful than 
the other, and that any attempt to standardize them would “not be a particularly fruitful exercise 
because the choice of reported earnings will likely depend on the specific hypothesis and context 
under consideration.”29 
                                                          
26
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
27
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
28
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
29
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
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There have also have been several studies which suggest the opposite. In “Assessing the 
Relative Informativeness and Permanence of Pro Forma Earnings and GAAP Operating 
Earnings,” a three year study found that abnormal returns on a firm’s equity is more responsive 
to pro forma earnings, as investors find these estimates provide a more accurate picture of actual 
earnings value.30 A subsequent study, “Who Trades on Pro Forma Earnings Information,” found 
that retail investors are much more likely to trade based on pro forma earnings than institutional 
investors.31 As such, “Do Managers Use Pro Forma Earnings to Exceed Analyst Forecasts?” 
finds that managers often define and issue pro forma earnings in such a way as to beat quarterly 
estimates.32 This should be compensated for by using analyst pro forma estimates, the 
implications of which will be discussed later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
30
 (E. L. Nilabhra Bhattacharya 2003) 
31
 (E. L. Nilabhra Bhattacharya 2006) 
32
 (Jeffrey T. Doyle 2002) 
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III: THEORY 
 
Derived from my research as noted above, I propose the following testable propositions: 
Media scrutiny has been shown to be a force in determining corporate policy, both in how 
a firm makes strategic decisions and sets the tone of its press releases and interaction. The 
volume of disclosures in financial statements which firms choose to include (from which, among 
other inputs, analysts construct pro forma estimates) is a significant corporate policy decision, 
one which managers have a variety of considerations to make before including them. Given what 
is known about the importance of media both in the formation of corporate policy itself and 
specifically regarding the way in which it releases their own pro forma estimates, it stands to 
reason that the volume of media scrutiny placed upon a firm would have a significant effect on 
the way it manages expectations.  
This relationship could be positive or negative. On the one hand, firms with large 
volumes of press coverage are likely to have variable events that necessitate the use of pro forma 
estimates to normalize expectations. As the media tends to follow news that is both positively 
and negatively unusual, a firm with a high volume of media coverage may be more likely to have 
a large difference between their “normalized” and GAAP earnings. Firms that experience a 
special earnings-related event may be more likely to want to curry favor with investors by being 
honest about the impermanence of that quarter’s earnings situation. 
Alternatively, firms with large media following may be disinclined to have a large 
difference between their GAAP and “normalized” earnings for a variety of reasons. The volume 
of media scrutiny could have a negative impact in the sense that firms that attract more media 
attention are less likely to be affected by one time earnings events. The probability that a 
10 
 
negative earnings event would have a significant effect on a firm’s profitability going forward 
could grow smaller as the firm grows larger, as the firm’s related risk is spread over a larger 
asset base. In contrast, a firm with a large media following may have disincentives to make 
negative pro forma adjustments, as the increase in volume of media scrutiny caused by a 
negative event could put unwanted pressure on management. A rebutting notion could be that the 
company could be so large that the volume of media coverage has little effect on corporate 
policy, and therefore has a correspondingly small effect on how the firm manages the 
expectations of its investors. Regardless of how these decisions are made, we must assume that 
industry and period conditions have a significant effect on corporate policymaking, with earnings 
expectation management being no exception. 
The ambiguity of the relevance of the usefulness of pro forma earnings as discussed in 
the literature review would seem to throw the applicability of my study into question. However, 
my hypothesis takes no particular stance on the root of particular motivations for the release of 
pro forma earnings. The fact that the motive exists is enough, and here I attempt to find whether 
or not media attention affects that motive whether it be to inflate earnings or to provide useful 
information to investors. However, this disagreement over their respective values to investors 
still provides applicable suggestions for the research method of my study. Given that firms with 
zero pro forma-GAAP difference likely have different characteristics than those who do not, it is 
worthwhile to explore whether or not the “modal” firm data should be included in the test.33 
Additionally, it is suggested that tests should account for differences in firms past accounting 
performance in addition to current data.34 As this study is interested in establishing the 
                                                          
33
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
34
 (Jeffrey S. Abarbnell 2010) 
11 
 
importance of media attention over a given time period, this suggestion is naturally taken into 
account.  
To test this hypothesis, we must control for the variables that have an effect of the 
corporate conditions and policy considerations listed above, namely the effects of industry, 
period, firm size, abnormal returns, and the effect of negative abnormal returns on media 
scrutiny. 
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IV: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Data and Variable Construction 
The final sample (Table 1) consists of data over 44 quarters from 2000 to 2011 with 324 
S&P 500 firms, resulting in 10,876 observations. This period was used due to the regulatory 
changes that occurred in 2000 regarding the use of pro forma and GAAP earnings statements, 
which affects the type of spin that firms implement.35 Calendar quarterly media volume data is 
provided by a Bloomberg story count search, which identifies individual stories printed in online 
and print sources where the name of the firm is mentioned. The data is filtered so that the 
number provided by the query does not repeat based on multiple mentions in one story. This data 
could not be matched to the respective firm’s fiscal period, therefore only S&P 500 firms whose 
fiscal periods coincides with calendar quarters could be used.  
To find the difference between earnings as provided by GAAP quarterly releases and pro 
forma earnings estimates, the data points over the periods were provided by Compustat and IBES 
respectively, sourced from WRDS. IBES analyst estimates are a commonly used proxy for 
official pro forma earnings releases.36 The IBES data point for the quarter was the most recent 
interim estimate provided. Earnings per share estimates were used as the marker for earnings, as 
EPS provided the most available data to maximize the size of the sample. The difference 
between the two was calculated as: 
|  | 
                                                          
35
 (Shibley Sadique 2008) 
36
 (W. Bruce Johnson 2005) 
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The absolute value is calculated to find the raw difference between the two numbers to 
compensate for the varying positive and negative values of GAAP relative to pro forma.   
To control for firm size, quarterly prices and share outstanding found in CRSP (sourced 
from WRDS) were multiplied to find the market capitalization for that period. To normalize the 
data, the operation log was performed.  
As the effect of bankruptcy risk and, indirectly, financial health is likely to be significant 
on the difference between GAAP and pro forma earnings, I decided to include the Altman Z-
Score in the regression. The score uses financial data to determine bankruptcy risk for a firm 
within two years. The Z-Score formula is defined as 
  .012  ! #$%$ &&& ' ( .014 
* +   !&
%$ &&& ' ( .033 
-.%
%$ &&&'
( .006 0 1$2 3 425%$ 67$& ' ( .009 
$&
%$ &&&' 
The required data to calculate the score was provided by CRSP, sourced from WRDS. When the 
Z-Score is greater than 2.6, the firm is not considered to be at risk of bankruptcy. When the Z-
Score is greater than 1.1 but less than 2.6, the firm is considered to be in a “grey zone” where its 
financial health implies that it is at increased risk of bankruptcy within the next two years. When 
the Z-Score is less than 1.1, the firm is likely to declare bankruptcy within the next two years. 
While it is typically normal practice to scale this variable, I have not as a high Z-Score is an 
indirect indicator of financial health. 
A scatter plot constituted of story count and market capitalization data shows that there is 
a concave trend, indicating that larger firms (particularly financial institutions and large 
consumer product producers) receive a disproportionate amount of news coverage. See Exhibit 3. 
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This dilutes the importance of media coverage for large firms, as previously discussed. I created 
a quadratic term, where 
52 &4  52 9 
in order to compensate for the edge outliers in the data that could negatively bias the importance 
of media scrutiny for the rest of the sample.  
Research suggests that managers in publicly held firms issue equity in anticipation of 
negative market returns.37 This suggests that firms make financial decisions based on how they 
expect to perform given an anticipated imminent market condition, a strategy that could be 
interpreted as another method of expectations management. In that vein, it seems prudent to 
control for any abnormal earnings effect on the GAAP-pro forma difference. To achieve this 
control, the three-month moving return of the S&P 500 was subtracted from each firm’s equity 
price. I then created a dummy variable indicating abnormal negative return on stock investments, 
of the form: 
*2 &!  1 3 7 $ 2 & : 0,  0 <=& 
The further application of this dummy, therefore, is to indicate a story volume that could be 
affected by an event that causes a negative abnormal return. To indicate this, return sign was 
multiplied by storycount to indicate raw negative effect and by storycountsq to indicate quadratic 
negative effect.  
A set of dummy variables based on the quarter period was created to control for temporal 
conditions, as the rate of media attention has increased over the period as a function of the 
development of the internet. An additional set of dummy variables were created to compensate 
                                                          
37
 (Malcolm Baker 2000) 
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for industry conditions, as certain industries are more likely to attract media attention than others. 
These dummies were generated by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, provided by 
CRSP and sourced from WRDS. 
See Table 2 for summary statistics of these explanatory variables. 
Methodology 
The empirical analysis consists of a simple regression of the winsorized absolute value of 
the difference between GAAP EPS and pro forma EPS estimates on the volume of stories 
mentioning the firm, the returns on the firm’s stock, the effect of stock returns on story volume, 
and the financial health of the firm. The regression is of the form:  
|&+33|  >?+@A&52  ( @92 &! ( @B2 &! C &52  (
@D&52 &4 ( @E2 &! C &52 &4 ( @F log ( @G& ( HI 
where storycount is the volume of media coverage, returnsign is the binomial marker of positive 
or negative abnormal returns, storycountsq is the volume of media coverage squared, 
log(mktcap) is the log of market capitalization, and zscore is the firm’s Altman Z-Score. 
Returnsign was multiplied by both storycount variables to provide information about the volume 
of media coverage when the firm experiences a negative abnormal return on its stock. The media 
volume data was staggered so as to compensate for the media coverage events that occur towards 
the end of the period that could not be captured in the lag time before earnings estimates were 
released. 
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Additionally, to determine the applicability of the theory that the distribution of the 
volume of media attention and firm size is concave and has a significant effect on the model, an 
additional regression was run of the form: 
|&+33|  >?+@A&52  ( @92 &! ( @B2 &! C &52  (
@D log ( @E& ( HI 
The significance of the remaining coefficients should determine if the concavity of media 
attention and firm size is relevant to the original model. 
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V: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
According to a study, panel data financial studies often incorrectly adjust standard errors 
for possible dependence in the residuals as they relate to firm specific effects.38 The study found 
that “only clustered standard errors are unbiased as they account for the residual dependence 
created by the firm effect.”39 As such, standard errors were clustered by the firm-level identifier 
provided by CRSP (permno) to correctly address any possible dependence in the residuals. 
The|epsdiff|, storycount, storycountsq, log(marketcap),  and zscore data was winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles to limit extreme values in the data and control for spurious outliers that could 
affect coefficient estimates. 
After observing the empirical results found in the study, I conclude that the volume of 
media coverage on a firm has a significant impact of the difference between GAAP EPS and pro 
forma EPS estimates.  
Table 3 gives a correlation matrix of the dependent variables used in the study. Negative 
abnormal returns are negatively correlated with both the volume of stories written about the firm 
and the log(mktcap), indicating the volume of stories about a firm decreases when a firm’s stock 
price underperforms.  It also is positively correlated with the firm’s Altman Z-Score, indicating 
that a negative abnormal return decreases as the likelihood of bankruptcy decreases (this does not 
seem important or appropriate, given that abnormal return does not indicate a loss). Story count 
is positively correlated with log(mktcap) and Altman Z-Score, indicating that firms’ media 
scrutiny increases as the firms increase in scale and suffer lower levels of bankruptcy risk. The 
negative abnormal earnings effect variable multiplied by both story count variables are positively 
                                                          
38
 (Petersen 2008) 
39
 (Petersen 2008) 
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correlated with log(mktcap) and Altman Z-Score, further indicating that the media will follow 
larger, more stable firms even if a negative abnormal earnings event occurs. log(mktcap) is 
positively correlated with Altman Z-Score, indicating that bankruptcy risk decreases as firm size 
increases. 
Table 4 reports the results of both regressions previously outlined. The regression that 
compensates for the concavity of media scrutiny and firm size finds that the volume of 
storycount, has a significant negative effect on the difference between GAAP earnings per share 
and pro forma earnings estimates. That is, firms with a large amount of media scrutiny in a 
period are likely to have a smaller difference between earnings measures. Further, negative 
abnormal stock returns have a similar significant negative effect on the earnings measure 
difference. It follows, then, that the media volume abnormal return variable would have a 
significant effect, and my regression finds that it does. However, the result is positive, indicating 
that stories that occur in the same period the negative returns cause the earnings measurable 
difference to be larger. Interestingly, the &52 &4 variables have an opposite function that 
the storycount variables. The effect of &52 &4 on the earnings measure difference is 
positive, indicating that larger firm’s expectations management is likely to be greater than small 
firms. The negative abnormal earnings &52 &4 variable has a negative effect on 
expectations management, indicating that the earnings measurable difference is not affected by 
sub-standard stock returns.  Firm-level control variables indicate that larger companies have a 
larger difference between GAAP and pro forma earnings, as suggested by the positive effect 
log(mktcap) has on the difference. The Altman Z-Score, by contrast, did not have a significant 
effect on the difference.  The regression yielded an adjusted *9 of 0.2. 
19 
 
The regression that does not compensate for the concavity of media scrutiny and firm size 
confirms the importance of the compensation to the model. Story volume, abnormal stock 
returns, the story volume during a period of negative abnormal return, and Altman Z-Score were 
all statistically insignificant. The only significant relationship is log(mktcap), which is not related 
to story volume. 
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VI: CONCLUSION 
 
This study empirically examines whether the volume of media scrutiny placed upon a 
firm affect the difference between GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings projections. 
Specifically, I examine the effect of the number of print news stories that mention or concern a 
broad swath of S&P 500 companies have on their normalized earnings expectations as they relate 
to GAAP earnings. In other words, I ask whether the pressure of a large amount of media 
attention can have an effect on a firm’s financial reporting policy. This study is unique in that, as 
of yet, there has not been a study that has investigated the ability of the media to affect this 
specific method of earnings expectation management. 
My findings show that the media does affect this difference negatively generally, but this 
effect is steadily diluted and made positive as the firm increases in size.  I find that smaller firm’s 
earnings expectation management is more likely to be affected by negative abnormal stock 
returns, while large firms are less likely to be affected. Finally, I find that the size of the firm has 
a positive effect on the difference between GAAP and pro forma earnings, while bankruptcy risk 
has no effect on the difference. Put simply, media scrutiny becomes much more important in 
how it affects a firm’s earnings expectation management policies as the firm becomes larger. It 
also implies that poor stock performance influences smaller firms to manage their earnings 
expectations more carefully, while compelling larger firms to engage in less expectations 
management. In contrast, the fact that Altman Z-Scores are insignificant indicates that positive 
news has no effect on expectation management. The Z-Score, while used primarily as a 
bankruptcy indicator, was not scaled, and therefore indicates that a firm is liquid and 
experiencing success as scaled by the formula. 
21 
 
This study, however, likely suffers from a lack of direct variables as a function of the 
limited research tools available to me. To start with, the generalized nature of the story volume 
variable likely contains a substantial amount of relayed information – that is, print media stories 
that simply are a reprinting of broad scale news wire services, like Reuters or the Associated 
Press. While this is somewhat compensated for by eliminating the inclusion of television media 
mentions, the problem likely still exists. A study that uses aggregates of original or exclusively 
financial reporting regarding an earnings-related event to further explore the relationship I have 
established could shed light on what specific media sources have an effect on earnings 
management expectations. My controls for negative media attention are similarly blunt. While 
negative abnormal stock returns may be a sign of a negative earnings related surprise, the 
estimator does not directly imply a negative event. A better method of signifying the effects of 
positive and negative stories on expectation management would be to use software that 
recognizes the positive or negative tone of specific articles. Finally, as noted, official pro forma 
earnings releases are sometimes manipulated to beat analyst estimates.40 A study could find a 
clearer picture of earnings expectation management by using the firm-issued pro forma earnings 
estimates rather than analyst estimates. 
However, that the existence of a relationship between media exposure and firms’ 
financial reporting policy is empirically demonstrated by the study. A further refinement of the 
parameters of variables should serve to illuminate the specificity of the relationship. 
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 (Jeffrey T. Doyle 2002) 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
      Number of Firms  
Initial sample 500 
Firms dropped because of data 
matching 163 
Final Sample 337 
Final number of observations   10876 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
absdiff 1.09 1.354 0 7.65 
ireturns 0.45 0.498 0 1 
storycount  906.156 1090.673 3 5569 
ireturns*storycount 384.253 820.463 0 5569 
storycountsq 2010575 4824544 9 3.10e+07 
ireturn*storycountsq 820747.7 3242338 0 3.10e+07 
log(mktcap) 16.055 1.176 13.212 19.18 
zscore 26.51 44.23 1.18 288.13 
 
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
  ireturns wstorycount  product wstorycountsq productsq wlog(mktcap) zscore 
ireturns 1 
storycount  -0.0441 1 
ireturns*storycount 0.5173 0.5281 1 
storycountsq -0.0354 0.9299 0.4928 1 
ireturn*storycountsq 0.2796 0.5598 0.9052 0.6096 1 
log(mktcap) -0.0324 0.4166 0.2283 0.3423 0.2122 1 
zscore 0.0287 0.1385 0.1142 0.1536 0.1352 0.1239 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 4 
Regression 
Staggered Story Count           
Dependent Variable: absepsdiff 
Compensating for Concavity  Not Compensating for Concavity 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(SE) t-statistic Variable Coefficient  t-statistic 
ireturns 
-0.1314       
(.039) 3.36 ireturns 
-0.058       
(.033) 1.75 
storycount  
-0.00022           
(.0001) 2.33 storycount  
-9.57e+-06           
(.00004) 0.25 
ireturns*storycount 
0.00017      
(.000055) 3.08 ireturns*storycount 
-1.31e+-06    
(.00002) 0.07 
storycountsq 
5.17e+-08 
(2.38e+-08) 2.17 log(mktcap) 
.1192  
(.0357) 3.34 
ireturn*storycountsq 
- 4.1e+-08 
(1.11e+-.08) 3.69 zscore 
- .0007 
(.0007) 1.09 
log(mktcap) 
0.1206        
(.035) 3.47 - - - 
zscore -.0079 (.00065) 1.2 - - - 
Adjusted *9 0.2   Adjusted  *9 0.2 
f-statistic 20   f-statistic 19 
Observations 10876   Observations 10876   
 
